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Judicial Decisions
Supreme Court of the United States, No. 73-1888
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., Petitionerv.
The Republic of Cuba et al.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. [May 24, 1976]
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.*
The issue in this case is whether the failure of respondents to return to
petitioner Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. (Dunhill), funds mistakenly paid by
Dunhill for cigars that had been sold to Dunhill by certain expropriated Cuban
cigar businesses was an "act of state" by Cuba precluding an affirmative
judgment against respondents....
I
In 1960, the Cuban government confiscated the business and assets of the five
leading manufacturers of Havana cigars. These companies, three corporations
and two partnerships, were organized under Cuban law. Virtually all of their
owners were Cuban nationals. None were American. These companies sold
large quantities of cigars to customers in other countries, including the United
States, where the three principal importers were petitioner, Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. (Dunhill), Saks and Co. (Saks) and Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc.
(Faber). The Cuban government named "interventors" to take possession and
operate the business of the seized Cuban concerns. Interventors continued to
ship cigars to foreign purchasers, including the United States importers.
This litigation began when the former owners of the Cuban companies, most
of whom had fled to the United States, brought various actions against the three
American importers for trademark infringement and for the purchase price of
any cigars that had been shipped to importers from the seized Cuban plants and
that bore United States trademarks claimed by the former owners to be their
property

. .

. Both the former owners and the interventors had asserted their

*Part III of this opinion is joined only by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE POWELL, and MR.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST.
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right to some $700,000 due from the three importers for post-intervention
shipments ... It also developed that as of the date of intervention, the three
importers owed sums totalling $477,600 for cigars shipped prior to intervention: Faber, $322,000; Dunhill, $148,600; and Saks, $6,600. These latter sums
the importers had paid to interventors subsequent to intervention on the assumption that interventors were entitled to collect the accounts receivable of the
intervened business. The former owners claimed title to and demanded payment
of these accounts.
Based on the "act of state" doctrine which had been reaffirmed in Banco
Nacionalde Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), the District Court held in
Palicio v. Brush, supra, and here, that it was required to give full legal effect
to the 1960 confiscation of the five cigar companies insofar as it purported to
take the property of Cuban nationals located within Cuba. Interventors were
accordingly entitled to collect from the importers all amounts due and unpaid
with respect to shipments made after the date of intervention. The contrary
conclusion was reached as to the accounts owing at the time of intervention:
because the United States courts will not give effect to foreign government
confiscations without compensation of property located in the United States
and because under Republic of Iraq v. FirstNational City Bank, 353 F.2d 47
(CA2 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966), the situs of the accounts
receivable was with the importer-debtors, the 1960 seizures did not reach the
preintervention accounts; and the former owners, rather than the interventors,
were entitled to collect them from the importers-even though the latter had
already paid them to interventors on the mistaken belief that they were fully
discharging trade debts in the ordinary course of their business.
This conclusion brought to the fore the importers' claim that their payment
of the preintervention accounts had been made in error and that they were
entitled to recover these payments from the interventors by way of setoff and
counterclaim. Although their position that the 1960 confiscation entitled them
to the sums due for preintervention sales had been rejected and the District
Court had ruled that they "had no right to receive or retain such payment,"
interventors claimed those payments on the additional ground that the obligation, if any, to repay was a quasi-contractual debt having a situs in Cuba and
that their refusal to honor the obligation was an act of state not subject to
question in our courts. The District Court rejected this position for two reasons.
First, the repayment obligated was more properly deemed situated in the United
States and hence remained unaffected by any purported confiscatory act of the
Cuban government. Second, in the District Court's view, nothing had occurred
which qualified for recognition as an act of state:
[T]here was no formal repudiation of the obligations by Cuban Government decree of
general application or otherwise ....
Here all that occurred was a statement by
counsel for the intervenors, during the trial, that the Cuban Government and the
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intervenors denied liability and had refused to make repayment. This statement was
made after the intervenors had invoked the jurisdiction of this Court in order to pursue
their claims against the importers for postintervention shipments. It is hard to
conceive how, if such a statement can be elevated to the status of an act of state, any
refusal of any state to honor any obligation at any time could be so considered anything else. 345 F. Supp., at 545.
The importers were accordingly held entitled to set off their mistaken payments
to interventors for preintervention shipments against the amounts due from
them for their post-intervention purchases . . . But Dunhill-and at last we
arrive at the issue in this case-was entitled to more from interventors$148,000-than they owed for post-intervention shipments-$93,000-and
to be made whole, asked for and was granted judgment against interventors
for the full amount of its claim, from which would be deducted the smaller
judgment entered against it.
The Court of Appeals, 485 F.2d 1355 (CA2 1975), agreed that the former
owners were entitled to recover from the importers the full amount of preintervention accounts receivable. It also held that the mistaken payments by
importers to interventors gave rise to a quasi-contractual obligation to repay
these sums. But contrary to the District Court, the Court of Appeals was of the
view that the obligation to repay had a situs in Cuba and had been repudiated
in the course of litigation by conduct that was sufficiently official to be deemed
an act of state: "[in the absence of evidence that the interventors were not
acting within the scope of their authority as agents of the Cuban government,
their repudiation was an act of state even though not embodied in a formal
decree." 485 F.2d, at 1371. Although the repudiation of the interventors'
obligation was considered an act of state, the Court of Appeals went on to hold
that FirstNational CityBank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 749 (1972),
entitled importers to recover the sums due them from interventors by way of
setoff against the amounts due from them for post-intervention shipments. The
act of state doctrine was said to bar the affirmative judgment awarded Dunhill
to the extent that its claim exceeded its debt. The judgment of the District Court
was reversed in this respect, and it is this action which was the subject of the
petition for certiorari filed by Dunhill ... We have now concluded that nothing
in the record reveals an act of state with respect to interventors' obligation to
return monies mistakenly paid to them. Accordingly we reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals.

The District Court and the Court of Appeals held that for purposes of this
litigation, interventors were not entitled to the preintervention accounts receivable by virtue of the 1960 confiscation and that, despite other arguments to
the contrary, nothing based on their claim to those accounts entitled interventors to retain monies mistakenly paid on those accounts by importers. We do
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not disturb these conclusions. The Court of Appeals nevertheless observed that
interventors had "ignored" demands for the return of the monies and had
"fail[ed] to honor the importers' demand (which was confirmed by the Cuban
government's counsel at trial)." This conduct was considered to be "the Cuban
government's repudiation of its obligation to return the funds" and to constitute
an act of state not subject to question in our courts. 485 F.2d, at 1369, 1371.
We cannot agree.
If interventors, having had their liability adjudicated and various defenses
rejected, including the claimed act of state with respect to preintervention
accounts represented by the Cuban confiscation in 1960, were nevertheless to
escape repayment by claiming a second and later act of state involving the funds
mistakenly paid them, it was their burden to prove that act. Concededly, they
declined to pay over the fun'ds; but refusal to repay does not necessarily assert
anything more than what interventors had claimed from the outset and what
they have continued to claim in this Court-that the preintervention accounts
receivable were theirs and that they had no obligation to return payments on
those accounts.' Neither does it demonstrate that in addition to authority to
operate commercial businesses, to pay their bills and to collect their accounts
receivable, interventors had beefi invested with sovereign authority to repudiate
all or any part of the debts incurred by those businesses. Indeed, it is difficult
to believe that they had the power selectively to refuse payment of legitimate
debts arising from the operation of those commercial enterprises.
In "The Gul Djemal," 264 U.S. 90 (1924), a supplier libeled and caused the
arrest of the Gul Djemal, a steamship owned and operated for commercial
purposes by the Turkish government, in an effort to recover for supplies and
services sold to and performed for the ship. The ship's master, "a duly commissioned officer of the Turkish Navy," appeared in court and asserted sovereign immunity, claiming that such an assertion defeated the court's jurisdiction. A direct appeal was taken to this Court, where it was held that the
master's assertion of sovereign immunity was insufficient because his mere
representation of his government as master of a commercial ship furnished no
basis for assuming he was entitled to represent the sovereign in other capacities.
Here there is no more reason to suppose that the interventors possess governmental, as opposed to commercial, authority than there was to suppose that
the master of the Gul Djemal possessed such authority. The master of the Gul
Djemal claimed the authority to assert sovereign immunity while the interventors claim that they had the authority to commit an act of state, but the difference is unimportant. In both cases, a party claimed to have had the authority
to exercise sovereign power. In both, the only authority shown is commercial
authority.
We thus disagree with the Court of Appeals that the mere refusal of the interventors to repay funds followed by a failure to prove that interventors "were not
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acting within the scope of their authority as agents of the Cuban government"
satisfied respondents' burden of establishing their act of state defense. Nor do
we consider Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), heavily relied upon
by the Court of Appeals, to require a contrary conclusion. In that case and in
Oetjen v. CentralLeatherCo., 246 U.S. 297 (1978), and Ricaud v. American
Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918), it was apparently concluded that the facts were
sufficient to demonstrate that the conduct in question was the public act of
those with authority to exercise sovereign powers and was entitled to respect
in our courts. We draw no such conclusion from the facts of the case before us
now. As the District Court found, the only evidence of an act of state other than
the act of nonpayment by interventors was "a statement by counsel for the
interventors, during the trial, that the Cuban Government and the interventors
denied liability and had refused to make repayment." 345 F. Supp., at 545. But
this merely restated respondents' original legal position and adds little, if anything, to the proof of an act of state. No statute, decree, order or resolution of
the Cuban government itself was offered in evidence indicating that Cuba had
repudiated her obligations in general or any class thereof or that she had as a
sovereign matter determined to confiscate the amounts due three foreign
importers.
II
If we assume with the Court of Appeals that the Cuban government itself
had purported to exercise sovereign power to confiscate the mistaken payments
belonging to three foreign creditors and to repudiate interventors adjudicated
obligation to return those funds, we are nevertheless persuaded by the arguments of petitioner and by those of the United States that the concept of an act
of state should not be extended to include the repudiation of a purely commercial obligation owed by a foreign sovereign or by one of its commercial
instrumentalities. Our cases have not yet gone so far, and we decline to expand
their reach to the extent necessary to affirm the Court of Appeals.
Distinguishing between the public and governmental acts of sovereign states
on the one hand and their private and commercial acts on the other is not a
novel approach ...
It is the position of the United States, stated in a brief filed by the Solicitor
General, that such a line should be drawn in defining the outer limits of the act
of state concept and that repudiations by a foreign sovereign of its commercial
debts should not be considered to be acts of state beyond legal question in our
courts

...

The major underpinning of the act of state doctrine is the policy of foreclosing
court adjudications involving the legality of acts of foreign states on their own
soil that might embarrass the Executive Branch of our Government in the
conduct of our foreign relations. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
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U.S., supra, at 427-428, 431-433. -But based on the presently expressed views
of those who conduct our relations with foreign countries, we are in no sense
compelled to recognize as an act of state the purely commercial conduct of
foreign governments in order to avoid embarrassing conflicts with the Executive
Branch. On the contrary, for the reasons to which we now turn, we fear that
embarrassment and conflict would more likely ensue if we were to require that
the repudiation of a foreign government's debts arising from its operation of
a purely commercial business be recognized as an act of state and immunized
from question in our courts . . . Repudiation of a commercial debt cannot,
consistent with this restrictive approach to sovereign immunity, be treated as an
act of state; for if it were, foreign governments, by merely repudiating the debt
before or after its adjudication, would enjoy an immunity which our government
would not extend them under prevailing sovereign immunity principles in this
country. This would undermine the policy supporting the restrictive view of
immunity, which is to assure those engaging in commercial transactions with
foreign sovereignties that their rights will be determined in the courts whenever
possible.
Although at one time this Court ordered sovereign immunity extended to a
commercial vessel of a foreign country absent a suggestion of immunity from the
Executive Branch and although the policy of the United States with respect to
its own merchant ships was then otherwise, BerizziBros. Co. v. The Pesaro, 271
U.S. 562 (1926), the authority of that case has been severely diminished by later
cases such as Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943), and Mexico v.
Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945) ...
In the last 20 years, lower courts have concluded in light of this Court's
decisions in Ex parte Republic of Peru, supra, and Mexico v. Hoffman, supra,
and from the Tate letter and the changed international environment that Berizzi
Bros. Co. v. Steamship Pesaro no longer correctly states the law; and they have
declined to extend sovereign immunity to foreign sovereigns in cases arising out
of purely commercial transactions. Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria
General, 336 F.2d 354 (CA2 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965); Petrol
Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, 360 F.2d 103 (CA2), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 931 (1966) ... Indeed, it is fair to say that the "restrictive theory" of sovereign immunity appears to be generally accepted as the prevailing law in this
country. ALl, Restatement (Second), Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, § 69 (1965) ... In their commercial capacities, foreign governments do
not exercise powers peculiar to sovereigns. Instead, they exercise only those
powers that can also be exercised by private citizens. Subjecting them in connection with such acts to the same rules of law that apply to private citizens is
unlikely to touch very sharply on "national nerves" . . . There may be little
codification or consensus as to the rules of international law concerning exerInternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. 3
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cises of governmental powers, including military powers and expropriations,
within a sovereign state's borders affecting the property or persons of aliens.
However, more discernible rules of international law have emerged with regard
to the commercial dealings of private parties in the international market. The
restrictive approach to sovereign immunity suggests that these established rules
should be applied to the commercial transactions of sovereign states.
Of course, sovereign immunity has not been pleaded in this case; but it is
beyond cavil that part of the foreign relations law recognized by the United
States is that the commercial obligations of a foreign government may be
adjudicated in those courts otherwise having jurisdiction to enter such judgments. Nothing in our national policy calls on us to recognize as an act of state a
repudiation by Cuba of an obligation adjudicated in our courts and arising out
of the operation of a commercial business by one of its instrumentalities. For
all the reasons which led the Executive Branch to adopt the restrictive theory
of sovereign immunity, we hold that the mere assertion of sovereignty as a
defense to a claim arising out of purely commercial acts by a foreign sovereign is
no more effective if given the label "Act of State" than if it is given the label
"sovereign immunity." ' In describing the act of state doctrine in the past we
have said that it "precludes the courts of this country from inquiring into the
validity of public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within
its own territory." Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401
(1964) (emphasis added), and that it applies to "acts done within their own
states, in the exercise of governmental authority." Underhillv. Hernandez, 168
U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (emphasis added). We decline to extend the act of state
doctrine to acts committed by foreign sovereigns in the course of their purely
commercial operations. Because the act relied on by respondents in this case
was an act arising out of the conduct by Cuba's agents in the operation of cigar
businesses for profit, the act was not an act of state.
Reversed.
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